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Introduction
In the context of a global climate agreement, a cap on fossil fuel consumption would have the same effects on global emissions as a cap on fossil fuel extraction, as consumption must equal extraction at the global level. If fossil fuel markets were efficient, the global costs of reducing emissions would also be the same. In this first-best situation, demand and supply side policies coincide with respect to efficiency. However, with limited participation in a climate agreement, or with unilateral action by a single country or coalition of countries, demand side versus supply side policies matters. Many jurisdictions show willingness to reduce CO 2 -emissions by restricting domestic demand for fossil fuels. Domestic supply side policies are less frequently discussed, let alone pursued.
The purpose of this paper is to deduce the cost-effective combination of the two types of policies, given a target for a country's (or coalition's) contribution to global CO 2 abatement. The result hinges critically on how domestic demand side and supply side policies affect global emissions through international markets. We explore analytically and numerically how the optimal domestic climate policies depend on market behaviour in the fossil fuel markets, the emissions from extraction, and the costs of downscaling domestic fossil fuel demand and supply. Domestic policy measures that reduce fossil fuel demand lead to lower international energy prices, and may also reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms in the world markets for energyintensive goods. Both effects cause so-called carbon leakages, i.e. increased consumption of and emissions from fossil fuels among free-riders; see, among others, Markusen et al. (1993; , Rauscher (1997) , and Böhringer et al. (2010) . Leakages occur also through supply side policies, i.e. policies that reduce fossil fuel extraction. Such supply side leakages result from increased supply by countries outside a climate coalition as international fuel prices rise. Harstad (2012) shows that supply side leakages can be completely avoided if the coalition buys marginal foreign fossil fuel deposits and conserves them. This renders the non-coalition's supply curve locally inelastic. Although this is a promising result, buying deposits may face several practical problems such as asymmetric information, contract incompleteness, and bargaining failures. In our paper, we focus on the trade-off 3 between domestic demand and supply side measures. We, thus, reserve a given unilateral contribution to global abatement to domestic action; the options of purchasing foreign fossil fuel deposits or international emission quotas are excluded.
Our case in the numerical analysis is Norway, which has an ambitious target for domestic demand side measures for 2020, but has so far not considered using supply side measures. The Norwegian lack of focus on supply side policies has been questioned by NGO's and media at home and internationally, see, e.g., The Economist (2009). While the country accounts for around 2 per cent of global oil production, it contributes to less than 0.3 per cent of global oil consumption (BP, 2013) .
The global combustion of fossil fuels extracted in Norway leads to CO 2 emissions that are about ten times higher than total emissions of CO 2 within Norway. Even though leakages are likely to be larger with supply side measures than demand side measures, we conclude that it is cost-effective for Norway to let most of the contribution to global emission reductions be achieved through supply side measures. In our benchmark scenario, only one third of a given global reduction should be realised through demand side measures; the remaining two thirds should come through supply side measures, that is, by reducing oil extraction.
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Previous literature on optimal (second-best) climate policy in the presence of carbon leakages through the international fuel markets has derived the optimal combination of producer and consumer taxes in a climate coalition, given a target for global emission reductions. Hoel (1994) models an aggregate fossil fuel market, and derives analytical expressions for optimal tax levels. Golombek et al. (1995) extend Hoel's analysis by modelling three fossil fuel markets (oil, coal and gas) and provide a numerical illustration of optimal producer and consumer taxation for a coalition of OECD countries, given competitive fossil fuel markets. They find that the optimal producer tax of oil should be negative, due to terms-of-trade effects dominating the leakage effects (OECD is a net importer of oil).
In practical policy the domestic action to meet a given global target will have to concur with other existing climate ambitions and commitments. For instance, Norway has demand side commitments in the EU Emissions Trading System and in the Kyoto agreements. Chapter 3 explains how these are accounted for in the computations. Note that to the extent that these commitments are not met by the domestic actions studied here, their fulfillment may imply extra costs. However, Norway has already shown willingness to do more than simply complying with international commitments, e.g., through over-fulfilling the Kyoto obligations in 2008-12, financing technology transfer and engaging in rainforest preservation in REDD+.
4 Hagem (1994) compares numerically the costs of pure demand side policy with pure supply side policy in the case of Norway, given a target for its contribution to global emission reductions in 2000.
The calculations assume competitive fuel markets and conclude that it would be less costly to reduce oil production than to introduce uniform taxes on fossil fuel consumption.
Our paper contributes to the theoretical literature by analysing how differences in emissions from fossil fuel extraction across countries affect the relative performance of demand side policies versus supply side policies. Furthermore, it supplements previous numerical analyses of demand versus supply sides policies in several ways: First, we analyse the impact of various non-competitive oil market assumptions. Second, we take into account emissions due to extraction of fossil fuels and, particularly, the differences in emission intensity across countries. Third, we incorporate the fact that both production costs and emission intensities are relatively high in the decline phase of an oil fieldhere we use detailed cost information from Norwegian oil fields. Fourth, previous estimates on cost and emission effects are outdated. In our updating of the information base we have included a review of the empirical literature on relevant price elasticities in order to assess likely carbon leakage rates on the demand as well as the supply side. The robustness of our calculations is checked with thorough sensitivity analyses.
Assumptions regarding supply and demand elasticities, as well as the competitive environment on the fuel markets, are decisive for our results on the optimal distribution of demand versus supply side policies. There is a large literature on OPEC behaviour (see e.g. Griffin, 1985; Alhajji and Huettner, 2000; Smith, 2005; Hansen and Lindholt, 2008) . Although the conclusions from this literature are rather mixed, one conclusion is that OPEC does not behave as a competitive producer. In our main case we model OPEC as a strategic player that seeks to maximize its income from annual oil production, while other producers are price-takers. To check the robustness of our results, we also consider the competitive case, along with situations where OPEC has price or production targets.
As fossil fuels are non-renewable resources, there are important dynamic properties of the market that our static analysis does not capture. A fossil fuel producer's optimization behaviour implies finding an extraction path that maximizes the present value of the resource, which depend on 5 the expected, future price path (Hotelling, 1931) . If producers expect a gradual tightening of climate policies, they may accelerate their extraction; see Sinn (2008) for a discussion of this "green paradox".
Thus, leaving out dynamic considerations may have implications for the results. On the other hand, Venables (2011) shows that although decreasing prices may speed up production on existing fields, it is offset by their postponing effect on field openings; see also Österle (2012) for a similar study.
Furthermore, the government can control the available cumulative production through their production licencing. Hoel (2013) considers supply-side policies and argues that conserving the marginal, most costly resources reduces both total and immediate resource extraction. These studies show the relevance of analysing fossil fuel policies in a static framework as ours even if some intertemporal reallocation is ignored. We restrict our carbon leakage considerations to those stemming from the fossil fuel markets, disregarding carbon leakages through the market for energy-intensive goods.
These leakages can be mitigated or completely abolished by compensation schemes for exposed industries (e.g. free allocation of permits) or by border tax adjustments (Böhringer et al., 2012a, and Hoel, 1996) . We therefore ignore this channel of carbon leakages.
Theoretical analysis

Unilateral climate policy
We consider a fossil fuel producing and consuming home country that aims to contribute to a certain reduction in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions ( A ), through a combination of domestic demand side and supply side policies. The country's aggregate benefits from domestic consumption of fossil fuels are given by ( , , ) A , where W is utility of consuming fossil fuels net of production and net import costs:
where E is global emissions and 0 E is the global emissions in absence of the unilateral, domestic policies. From the first-order conditions for this maximization problem, we find that:
λ is the shadow cost of the emission constraint, while  They depend on the impacts of domestic demand and supply changes in the fossil fuel markets, which we will explore further in the next subsection.
are the terms-of-trade effects. If the country is a net exporter of a fuel, a higher price improves terms of trade. Hence, the terms-of-trade effects for a fuel exporter will tend to favour supply side policies, i.e. to reduce production rather than consumption. Note that this effect occurs also in the absence of climate policy. In the following we will disregard terms of trade effects, as the price changes and consequently the welfare impacts of this can be considered minor for the small home country, relative to the other terms in eqs. 
P -c (x ) E
), across all fuels. Given that domestic consumers and producers are price takers and maximize their net benefit and profit, it is shown in Golombek et al. (1995) that the optimal outcome can be achieved by introducing fuel-specific consumer taxes, = In the following subsection we disregard emissions in the fossil fuel extraction processes, but return to this in subsection 2.3.
Global emissions from demand and supply side measures
Let capital letters denote foreign production and consumption of the three fossil fuels (X i and
). As all fuels are measured in units of their carbon content, total global emissions from combustion of fossil fuels, E , must equal global fossil fuel production, which again must equal global consumption:
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To simplify the analytical derivations, we treat domestic consumption (y i ) and production (x i ) as exogenous variables, set by the domestic regulator. 2 In the numerical analysis we derive the optimal consumer and producer taxes, given profit maximizing domestic producers and welfare maximizing domestic consumers.
We assume that foreign consumers are price takers, where demand for each fuel is a function of all energy prices (
For each fuel market, foreign production must equal foreign consumption plus net import from the home country:
We further assume competitive behaviour by foreign coal and gas producers. Their aggregate supply functions are given by:
The oil market is characterised by a dominant producer (OPEC) with a competitive fringe (Non-OPEC):
where Z is output from the dominant oil producer, and
SPis aggregate supply from the competitive fringe. From (6) - (8), we write the equilibrium fuel prices as functions of net import from the home country and supply of oil from the dominant oil producer:
Our default assumption is that the dominant oil producer maximises net income. However, we also consider other objective functions in the numerical analysis 3 .
If the dominant oil producer seeks to maximize net income, Z is found from:
where   CZis the production cost. The first order condition is given by:
From (9) and (11), we can write all prices as functions of net import from the home country:
As international fossil fuel prices are functions of net import from the home country, domestic climate policies will affect emissions abroad. We define the marginal demand side carbon leakage of
L , as the increase in consumption abroad (measured in carbon units) following from a unit decrease in domestic consumption of fuel i:
To simplify the discussion, we make the following reasonable assumption:
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We define marginal supply side leakage of fuel i (
S i
L ) as the increase in total fossil fuel production abroad (measured in carbon units) following from a unit decrease in domestic production of fuel i. As total consumption must equal total production, and y i is exogenous, we see from (6) that:
Hence, we can express the marginal impact on total emissions of domestic climate policies as functions of the demand side carbon leakage:
We see from (16) that demand side policies are more (less) effective in terms of global emission reduction than supply side policies when the demand side leakage rate is less (bigger) than 0.5 (
). We also notice that
EE
If both domestic consumption and domestic production decrease by one unit, there is no impact on fossil fuel prices, and the final global impact is one unit less emitted.
So far we have disregarded emissions due to extraction of fossil fuels. Fossil fuels are used as input factors in the extraction process, and emission intensities vary quite a lot across sources. Hence, the global impact of domestic policies should be adjusted accordingly.
Including emissions from fossil fuel extraction
Let E denote total emissions (fossil fuel consumption including emissions from extraction): 
where D ji l is the demand side leakage from fuel j (increased consumption of fuel j abroad due to reduced consumption of fuel i at home):
We see that
=1
.
If both domestic consumption and production decrease by one unit, there is still no leakage, but as domestic fuel production causes emissions from extraction, global emissions decrease by more than one unit.
Comparing the impact on global emissions with and without including the emissions from fossil fuel extraction, we find that:
We cannot in general say whether including emissions from extraction makes demand side policies more or less effective than supply side policies, in terms of global emission reductions. This Given that emissions from extraction of fossil fuels abroad are identical, (
we find:
We see that for any given leakage rate 
Numerical analysis
We now turn to the comparison of demand and supply side policies in the case of Norway. In Supply side measures are quantified by identifying representative, marginal cuts in Norwegian oil production. Norway is also a significant producer of gas, accounting for around 3 per cent of global gas production (BP, 2013). Gas is, however, a fossil fuel with relatively low emissions and with larger substitutability against the high-emitting coal. Hence, it is not clear whether reduced Norwegian gas 13 extraction would decrease or increase global emissions and we do not consider this supply side option in our analysis. 
Unilateral climate policy
Demand side policies
The Norwegian parliament has announced high ambitions for its contribution to global (demand side) emissions reductions, corresponding to a 30 per cent reduction from Norwegian 1990 emissions by 2020. Moreover, it has emphasised that the lion's share of the reductions is to result from domestic action. To obtain a marginal cost function for demand side measures in Norway, we use Statistics Norway's technology-rich CGE model for the Norwegian economy, MSG-TECH (see Faehn et al., 2013a) . We simulate costs of uniform emissions pricing, given different demand side abatement levels. The effects are measured from a reference scenario that incorporates climate policies already implemented, approved, or promised for the years up to 2020. From 2008, this includes the participation in the EU ETS. 6 Since we assume that the demand side abatement aims to contribute to global emissions reductions, we only consider emissions pricing in sectors outside the EU ETS. With the cap on total 5 We abstract from the technical challenges of separating oil and gas extraction, but return to this issue in Section 3.3.1. 6 The same simulated scenario is used in Climate Cure 2020 (2010), the report of an officially appointed commission tasked with preparing the ground for evaluating Norway's climate policy. 14 emissions in the EU ETS, additional cuts in Norwegian ETS sectors will merely displace emissions to ETS-regulated installations in other European countries. 
A D denotes the level of domestic emission reductions (measured in million tonnes of CO 2 ).
Supply side policies
The costs of supply side measures in our static framework are the forgone profits by not extracting the oil, corresponding to
; see the numerator of the second fraction of Eq. (4).
We single out oil fields which can be characterized as marginal, in the sense that terminating extraction involves small profit losses per unit extracted. Oil fields in the decline phase generally have higher costs than fields in the plateau phase. Explanations are that marginal operating costs, including energy input, are increasing as remaining oil in the reservoir declines. In addition, IOR (Improved Oil Recovery) activities to prolong the lifetime of maturing fields can involve new costly investments, implying that the profit losses of not undertaking an IOR project may be modest (not always though).
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Typically, these fields also have higher emission intensity. Unfortunately, we have limited information about IOR costs (see below).
For the years 2009-2011 we have singled out nine Norwegian fields where oil constituted a major part of total petroleum production (several were pure oil fields). In addition, these fields were in, or close to, the decline phase. We have field data from Statistics Norway on production volumes and variable costs, costs that would not accrue if oil production were terminated.
7 Based on these data we have constructed the marginal production cost curve.
To calculate marginal forgone profits by reduced oil production, we apply the average oil price over the period (USD 84.5 per barrel of Brent Blend), and subtract the marginal production costs. The results can be considered as the marginal costs of forgone oil extraction in Norway, and are shown in Figure 2 . The supply side cost curve, where A S is reduced extraction measured in million tonne s of CO 2 , is:
We see that it is actually profitable to reduce 0.7 Mt of CO 2 , irrespective of climate benefits, due to high production costs of some of the smaller fields. On the other hand, some fields that are now in their plateau phase will be in their decline phase around 2020, suggesting that their costs per unit production will increase. It is difficult to know whether the net effect of these considerations will push the cost curve in Figure 2 up or down.
However, there are several reasons why we may have underestimated the total costs of production, i.e., overestimated the costs of reducing production. First, we do not have specific information about the costs of IOR projects, which are often projects with limited profits per unit of extraction. 8 Second, we have only considered advanced termination of maturing fields, in which case development costs are sunk. A cost-effective downscaling of oil production may also imply that some fields with limited profitability are not developed at all. Then development costs, that incur during the first initial years and can be considerable, are not sunk.
To help assessing the relevance of Figure 2 for coming years, we have also gathered information on an oil field named Ivar Aasen that is decided to be developed. Here we have access to information about both expected annual development and operating costs, as well as production (The Norwegian Oil Company, 2012) 9 . Investments for this field started in 2013, with production expected to set off in 2016. Based on the reported data we calculate a break-even oil price of USD 60 per barrel for this field, using a discount rate of 6 per cent which the oil company uses. 10 With an average production of 1.4 million Sm 3 over the period 2016-2028 and a break-even oil price of USD 60 per barrel, this is comparable to the data behind Figure 2 for the years 2009-2011 (i.e., the lower third part of the curve). 11 In addition, Rystad (2013) points to several Norwegian (undeveloped) oil fields with break-even prices above USD 72 per barrel. These observations support our belief that the costs of reducing oil production are lower than what we assume in our analysis.
The oil price around 2020 may be higher than it was in 2009-2011, which for given costs suggests that forgone profits of reduced oil extraction may be higher. However, extraction costs have tended to be positively correlated with the oil price, meaning that the effect of a high oil price on forgone profits could be moderated. In addition, a higher oil price would entail higher oil production in the reference case, i.e., a situation without new policies. We are interested in the marginal costs of reducing oil production compared to this reference case. Hence, it is not certain that a higher oil price will lead to higher costs of reducing oil production from a level endogenously determined by the oil price.
To sum up, although the uncertainties are rather large, it seems more likely that the marginal costs of supply side measures around 2020 lie below than above the curve shown in Figure 2 . 8 The variable costs for the nine fields reported above also include some investment costs for drilling purposes, which may be characterized as IOR-activities. We do not have complete information about the IOR projects, however. 9 This was the only oil field with sufficiently detailed official data to calculate approximate break-even prices. 10 The break-even oil prices with 4 and 10 per cent discount rates are USD 58 and USD 65, respectively. Note that these estimates must be seen as approximate as the information is gathered by looking at graphs. The future oil price used in the impact assessment of the Ivar Aasen project seems to be around USD 90 per barrel. 11 An oil price of USD 84.5 per barrel, and a break-even price of USD 60 per barrel, implies a cost of USD 24.5 per barrel forgone oil production, corresponding to USD 58 per tonne CO 2 . 1.4 million Sm 3 of oil leads to 3.7 million tonnes of CO 2 when it is combusted.
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Numerical analysis of global fossil fuel markets 3.2.1 The partial fossil fuel market model
Based on the exposition in Section 2, we construct a simple numerical model that makes it easy to identify and adjust the basic assumptions driving the results. The main drivers are i) price responsiveness on the demand side (including substitution effects between oil and other fossil fuels), ii) price responsiveness of Non-OPEC supply, iii) OPEC's response, and iv) differences in emission intensity in oil extraction. We consider iso-elastic demand functions (i.e., with constant direct and cross price elasticities), iso-elastic supply functions for competitive fossil fuel producers, and constant unit production costs for OPEC (when behaving as a dominant producer). As we are focusing on a permanent cut in oil supply as a potential supply-side measure, we are mostly interested in the longrun effects in the market, i.e., we consider long-run elasticities. Finally, we model fixed emission intensities in oil extraction, but these should be interpreted as emission intensities of marginal production. Appendix B contains a detailed discussion of the main drivers, in particular a review of existing demand and supply elasticity estimates from the literature. Here we only present the assumptions of our benchmark case, which are motivated in the appendix.
Oil price increases may reduce oil consumption in various ways. Oil consumers may reduce their total energy use, or they may switch to other energy goods such as coal, gas or renewables.
Switching to other energy goods requires that there are viable alternatives, which will vary across sectors. Reducing total energy use may either involve reduced use of energy services (e.g., driving fewer miles, producing/consuming less energy-intensive products), or using more energy-efficient vehicles (or transport modes), capital, or equipment. In the long run, higher prices may also stimulate the development of more oil-efficient technologies. In principle, long-run price elasticities should capture all these effects. Based on the literature review, we apply a direct price elasticity of -0.5 in the long run, and cross-price elasticities for coal and gas of 0.08. However, we report the effects of other estimates as well.
Higher prices of oil increase the profitability of oil exploration, new fields developments, and IOR projects. Oil resources that are relatively cheap to extract will not be influenced by moderate oil price changes -it is merely a matter of time when these resources will be extracted.
12 Thus, an increase in the price of oil will mostly affect extraction of so-called marginal resources, such as exploration and field development in ultra-deep waters, developments of smaller fields and unconventional oil, and IOR projects. Higher oil prices may also lead to improved technologies in the long run, similarly to oil-efficiency improvements on the demand side. Based on the literature review,
we use a supply elasticity of 0.5 for Non-OPEC. This implies that oil demand and Non-OPEC supply are equally price elastic. However, due to substitution between oil and other fossil fuels, the fossil fuel demand elasticity (with respect to the oil price, and measured in carbon units) becomes around -0.4.
As discussed in Section 2, our default assumption in our benchmark case is that OPEC behaves as a dominant producer. The unit production cost of OPEC then has to be calibrated so that our reference simulation is consistent with base year data (2011). In our benchmark case, the unit marginal production cost of OPEC turns out to be 45 per cent of the oil price, which is within the range of production costs reported by IHS CERA for OPEC countries (see e.g. Figure 3 .9 in Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2011). 13 When we model OPEC as a competitive producer, we assume the same supply elasticity as for Non-OPEC.
Although the lion's share of CO 2 -emissions from oil use takes place as the oil is combusted, emissions from oil extraction have to be counted, as well. According to OGP (2012), the average GHG emissions per unit production worldwide in 2011 were 159 tonnes CO 2 e (CO 2 equivalents) per 1,000 toe hydrocarbon produced. The figure for the Middle East is only 51 tonnes CO 2 e, but the coverage is less comprehensive for this region -hence the real average could potentially be higher.
The European figure is 84 tonnes CO 2 e. OGP (2012) The average figures reported above will typically deviate from the marginal change in emissions of increased or reduced oil production. Reduced oil production in Norway could e.g. involve reduced IOR activity or advanced termination of a field. In both these cases, energy use per unit extraction will tend to be higher than average, see Faehn et al. (2013b) , Appendix C. The same could be true for reduced oil exploration or field developments, at least in aggregate, as the marginal areas or fields will tend to be less profitable, which often means that more costly energy is needed per unit production.
Similarly, increased supply from other Non-OPEC producers could imply higher-than-average emission intensities. For instance, Canadian oil sands are considered relatively costly and thus marginal resources, with average emission intensities around three times the world average. When it comes to OPEC supply, however, increased production may come from increased extraction of developed fields in countries like Saudi Arabia, and thus to a lesser extent involve higher emission intensities.
Our benchmark case assumption is that marginal emission intensities are 50 per cent above the reported average figures above. For Norway and (other) Non-OPEC this is related to the marginal supply most likely being more emission-intensive than average supply. For OPEC the increase is partly related to less comprehensive reporting and reliance on Middle East figures (see above) and partly to marginal supply possibly being more emission-intensive than average supply. Thus, we set the emission intensities in Norway, OPEC and Non-OPEC equal to respectively 90, 76 and 300 tonnes CO 2 e per 1,000 toe. 15 For comparison, emissions from consuming (i.e., combusting) 1,000 toe of oil is 14 OGP (2012) reports both emissions and production data for seven regions of the world. We deduct emissions and production from the Middle East and half of those from Europe (i.e., Norway), and calculate the emission intensity for the remaining regions, which we then assume is representative for Non-OPEC. 15 It could be argued that the emission intensity of Norwegian oil extraction should be set to zero, as these emissions are regulated by the EU ETS, which has a cap on overall emissions (cf. the discussion of ETS sectors in Section 3.1.1). As seen in the following subsection, however, these emissions are of less importance. about 3,070 tonnes of CO 2 . Although of minor importance here, we also account for emissions from extracting other fossil fuels, and set emission intensities for coal and gas equal to the Non-OPEC emission intensity reported above.
Effects on global emissions of demand and supply side policies
We first report the simulation results of exogenously reducing Norwegian oil extraction or consumption by one unit of carbon. We are interested in the net effects on global emissions, i.e., the denominators  α , i.e., the emissions from domestic extraction (relative to emissions from consumption). Table 1 displays the net global emission reductions when OPEC acts as either a dominant or a competitive producer. The table also shows the various components of the emission reductions. Note that the leakage rate L D defined in Section 2 is equal to minus the sum of "Oil market leakage" and "Coal/gas market leakage" under "Demand side" policy (and also equal to the sum of the three first components under "Supply side" policy).
We first notice that leakage through the oil market is around 50 per cent for both demand side and supply side leakage. This is certainly the case if OPEC acts competitively, and follows straightforwardly from the assumption of equal (absolute values of) supply and demand elasticities. If OPEC acts as a dominant producer, it is optimal for the producer group to adjust its supply slightly more to changes in Norwegian supply or demand compared to in the competitive case, but the difference is not big: Supply side leakage through the oil market is 55 per cent, compared to 45 per cent for demand side leakage.
Next, we see from Table 1 that overall market leakage is substantially lower under demand side policy than under supply side policy, whether OPEC behaves competitively or as a dominant producer. This is due to substitution between oil and other fossil fuels, which obviously goes in different direction depending on whether the oil price drops (demand side) or increases (supply side).
When oil demand abroad increases (decreases) due to reduced Norwegian oil consumption 22 (extraction), coal and gas consumption is somewhat reduced (increased). This effect alone accounts for almost 10 per cent of the gross emission reduction.
Finally, the importance of emissions from fossil fuel extraction is modest, accounting for less than 10 per cent of total emissions from extracting and consuming oil. The effects are highest for demand side policy, as under supply side policy increased emissions from oil extraction outside
Norway are modified by reduced emissions from oil extraction in Norway. Obviously, net emission reductions are sensitive to a number of assumptions such as price elasticities and OPEC behaviour. Hence, in subsection 3.3.2 below we present a detailed sensitivity analysis. We now use the findings in Table 1 to analyse the optimal balancing of demand and supply side policies, focusing on the case with OPEC as a dominant producer.
Optimal balancing of demand and supply side policies 3.3.1 The cost-effective solution
By combining the demand side and supply side cost curves and their net effects on global emissions derived above, we can find the optimal composition of domestic action for any global 23 contribution target, A , as expressed in Eq. (1). We pick a target of 5 Mt of CO 2 by 2020. 16 In Figure   3 we show a bath tub diagram with length equal to 5 A  , and where the marginal costs of demand (supply) side measures are shown from left to right (right to left). The intersection point between the two curves shows the optimal combination of demand and supply side measures. We notice that about 2/3 of the global contribution target should be met through reduced oil extraction. The corresponding marginal costs of reducing global CO 2 emissions are 336 USD per ton. If the global reductions were to be met through demand side measures alone, costs would more than double. Implementing this combination of demand and supply side measures would mean that domestic CO 2 emissions should be reduced by 2.5 Mt of CO 2 , e.g., through a domestic CO 2 tax on non-EU ETS sectors of 228 USD per tonne CO 2 (cf. Figure 1) . 17 Almost 90 per cent of the measures 16 5Mt of global CO 2 emission reductions by 2020 is in line with the global emissions reductions (including leakages) that can be achieved by fulfilling the Norwegian target for domestic emissions reductions by increased abatement in Norwegian non EU-ETS sectors, see Faehn et al. (2013b) . 17 The domestic CO 2 tax is found by multiplying the marginal cost of reducing global CO 2 emissions (336 USD per ton) with the net effect on global emissions of reduced Norwegian consumption (0.676 -see Table 1 ).
that are profitable to carry out relate to transportation, of which reduced private transport accounts for 20 per cent and transition to more climate friendly vehicles accounts for the rest.
Moreover, Norwegian oil extraction should be reduced by 3.5 million Sm 3 , which is 3.1 per cent of total Norwegian oil production in 2012. This reduction can be achieved in different ways, e.g., through a production tax on Norwegian oil extraction. The optimal marginal cost of reduced CO 2 emission estimated above corresponds to a production tax of USD 50 per barrel, 18 i.e., around half of the current crude oil price. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the break-even price of the Ivar Aasen oil field, which can be characterized as relatively profitable, is around USD 60 per barrel.
Below we discuss the pros and cons of implementing a production tax. Here we want to emphasize that a production tax of around USD 50 per barrel could potentially lead to a much bigger reduction in oil extraction than the 3.1 per cent calculated above. The reason is that, as underlined in Section 3.1.2, we most likely overestimate the costs of reducing oil extraction.
Sensitivity analysis
There are other uncertainties in our calculations, too, especially the effects in the fossil fuels markets of reduced oil extraction or consumption in Norway. In Table 2 we present a number of sensitivity analyses where we adjust assumptions from our benchmark case. 19 The global contribution target is held fixed at 5 Mt CO 2 .
We notice from Table 2 that assuming competitive behaviour by OPEC gives more or less the same results as above -this is not surprising given the results in Table 1 . Besides that, we see that the share between supply-and demand side measures depends quite a lot on what we assume about the oil market. If we think that OPEC keeps its supply fixed, or if demand is twice as elastic as supply, cuts in oil extraction are even more effective in reducing global emissions, and the share of supply side measures increases to around 90 per cent. Nevertheless, the optimal production tax does not change 18 The production tax is found by multiplying the marginal cost of reducing global CO 2 emissions (336 USD per ton) with the net effect on global emissions of reduced Norwegian extraction (0.353 -see Table 1 ), and then multiplying this with the CO 2 content of a barrel of oil (0.42). 19 The sensitivity analysis is discussed in more detail in Faehn et al. (2013b) If we think that supply is twice as elastic as demand, cuts in oil extraction is less effective and the share of supply side measures drop to 25 per cent. Again, we see that the optimal production tax is less affected, while the domestic CO 2 price has increased quite a lot. If OPEC for some reason chooses to keep the oil price fixed, reduced oil extraction gives no climate benefits at all, and we are back to the conventional choice of only doing demand side policies.
If we have overestimated the costs of reduced oil extraction, we should undertake even more supply side measures than suggested by Figure 3 . Moreover, the optimal domestic CO 2 price and the optimal production tax for Norwegian oil extraction should then be reduced. For instance, if we scale down the supply side cost curve by 50 per cent, supply side measures should account for 83 per cent of total abatement, with the optimal domestic CO 2 price and production tax being 126 USD per tonne CO 2 and 28 USD per barrel; see Table 2 .
On the other hand, we have ignored the challenges of separating oil and gas extraction, which may suggest that we have underestimated the forgone profits of reduced oil extraction. However, the share of gas in total oil and gas production for the nine fields studied above was merely 5 per cent.
Moreover, for 8 of the 13 fields currently under development on the Norwegian shelf, more than 90 per cent of recoverable reserves are oil (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013). Hence, this may be of limited importance.
The higher the oil price, the less profitable it is to restrict extraction from a given oil field. As explained in subsection 3.1.2, however, a higher oil price does necessarily mean that supply side measures become more costly, as more expensive resources will then be extracted in the reference 26 case. Anyway, it is very unlikely that it is cost effective to rely only on demand side measures. Given the benchmark case estimates of i x E and i y E , it is optimal to implement some supply side measures as long as the net revenue of the least profitable oil extraction is less than 116 USD per barrel. A , would not be reached with these moderate measures -global emissions would decline by a little more than one million tonnes.
In our benchmark case, the derived marginal costs of emission reductions translate into a shadow price on oil production equal to 50 USD per barrel. This shadow price can in principle be implemented through a corresponding production tax on all oil production in Norway. However, implementing such a large tax overnight is not without drawbacks. First, we have already noted above that we may have overestimated the costs of reducing oil extraction. As a thought experiment, assume that half of Norwegian oil production becomes unprofitable with the indicated tax level, and that the forgone profits amount to on average 25 USD per barrel, i.e., half of the tax. Using the production level of 2012, total costs would then be 17 billion USD, compared to 1.1 billion USD in the benchmark solution. Although this thought experiment may be somewhat extreme, it illustrates that there is a substantial downside risk by implementing such a large production tax for such a big sector.
Second, Norwegian authorities have, for good reasons, been cautious about changing the taxation rules, at least for already developed fields. Implementing additional taxes could be seen as changing the rules of the game, increasing the risk of doing business on the Norwegian continental shelf. Hence, it is easier to make a case for imposing a large production tax on extraction from undeveloped fields, unexplored areas and even developed fields requiring upgrading through IOR projects, than on sanctioned extraction from developed fields. 20 The Norwegian CO2 tax is differentiated across fuels and sectors. The highest tax level in non-ETS sectors is on petrol, at 393 NOK (66 USD) per tonne CO 2 (in 2013), cf. Ministry of Finance (2012).
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An alternative supply side policy, e.g., combined with a more limited production tax, could be to have a more restrictive practise when it comes to opening new areas for oil exploration. At least it seems reasonable to take a global perspective similar to the one in this paper when undertaking impact assessments of opening new areas for exploration
Conclusions
The conventional way of implementing policies to reduce CO 2 emissions is through the demand side, that is, introducing measures or instruments to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. In a closed market such as the global economy, demand and supply side measures may be equivalent.
This is not the case, however, when only one or a group of countries implement climate policies.
Demand and supply side measures will then have different effects, depending, in particular, on the price responsiveness on the demand and supply side of the market.
In this paper we have derived analytical expressions for the optimal combination of demand and supply side policies for a fossil fuel producing and consuming country that has a fixed target for its contribution to reducing global emissions. We have also accounted for emissions from the extraction of fossil fuels, which comes in addition to emissions from the use (i.e., combustion) of the fuels.
Based on this analytical framework, we have analysed the optimal combination of demand and supply side climate policies for a small oil producing country, Norway, using data for domestic abatement costs and forgone profits for Norwegian oil production, as well as a transparent model of international fossil fuel markets. We find that a majority of measures should be implemented on the supply side, that is, by reducing Norwegian extraction of oil. In our benchmark case the optimal combination of demand and supply side measures involves annual cuts in Norwegian oil extraction of around 3.5 million Sm 3 (around 3 per cent of current Norwegian oil production), and annual domestic reductions in CO 2 emissions of 2.5 million tonnes of CO 2 (almost 5 per cent of current Norwegian CO 2 emissions). In contrast, the Norwegian Government suggests using demand side measures, only. We 29 find that such a strategy more than doubles the costs. It should be noted that as our numerical approaches are designed for long run assessments, transaction costs of reallocating resources to the new equilibrium are not included. These can be significant, given our focus on the year 2020.
However, it should be noted that transaction costs are relevant for both demand and supply side strategies. Despite a number of uncertainties in our calculations, the conclusion that a majority of the global emission reductions should be taken through supply side measures, seems quite robust.
The optimal policy combination is, at least in principle, a tax per tonne domestic CO 2 emissions and a tax per barrel of domestic oil extraction. The tax levels we derive in our benchmark case are high, driven e.g. by the high costs of reducing Norwegian emissions from sectors that are not regulated by the EU ETS. Implementing such high taxes overnight is not without drawbacks, especially on the supply side, and we have discussed alternative ways of implementing cuts in Norwegian oil extraction.
Although our numerical case has been Norway, the question of demand side versus supply side climate policies is relevant for all fossil fuel producing countries. For instance, the EU has introduced a number of demand side measures such as the EU ETS, but no supply side measures yet.
Reduced coal extraction is a potential climate policy measure, given that it leads to higher international coal prices and lower coal consumption outside the EU. Thus, an interesting follow-up study could be to examine the optimal combination of demand and supply side measures in the EU or other countries with unilateral climate policies.
